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ABSTRACT
ALLISON RENE ELLZEY: The Declining Status and Increasing Pluralism of the
Catholic Church in the Formation of Religious Generation Gaps in Spain, 1936-1990
(Under the direction of Jason KJodt)

This thesis examines age-related differences in religious practice and opinion in
Spain and the influence of the declining status and increasing pluralism of the Catholic
Church in the formation of these differences. It argues that there are three distinct age
groups with respect to external religious manifestations and that the socialization of these
cohorts coincides with three distinct time periods of differing degrees of power and unity
of the Church. The introduction lays a historical backdrop for the rest of the work,
tracing the status of the Spanish Church from the Civil War through the 1980s. The
second chapter defines the age groups with respect to several external religious factors,
including church attendance, confidence in the Church as an institution, and opinions
concerning abortion and divorce. It uses data from the 1990-1993 World Values Surveys
to support the existence of these age gaps, which are the highest in Western Europe. The
age groups are defined as persons bom before 1940, persons bom between 1940 and
1960, and persons bom between 1960 and 1975, and the corresponding time periods of
socialization are defined as follows: 1940-1960 for the oldest cohort, 1960-1975 for the
middle age group, and 1975-1990 for the youngest group. The third chapter discusses the
declining political and social power of the Catholic Church and its contribution to the
formation of the generational differences, and the fourth chapter highlights the influence
of increasing pluralism within the Spanish Church on the establishment of the age groups.
The concluding chapter postulates the stabilization of the age-related differences and a
continued decrease in religiosity as Spain moves away from the Franco era.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the days of the Reconquest, the Spanish state and the Catholic Church have
been almost inextricably linked. The Spanish Inquisition, rule of the Catholic monarchs
and the influence of the Church* in colonial Spain all have contributed to this connection,
it is difficult to envision Spain without picturing its grand cathedrals and vibrant religious
festivals. When the glory of old Catholic Spain disintegrated with the loss of its

overseas

colonies in 1898, Spain began to look for its identity outside the Church, a search that
contributed largely to the establishment of the Second Republic in 1931. For the first
time in centuries, the Church did not enjoy a position of authority within the political
system, and the chaos and even anticlericalism that emerged during these years provided
an opening for overthrow, an opportunity that General Francisco Franco seized just five
years later. The three-year civil war that followed claimed thousands of lives, and both
sides committed atrocities. The end of the war heralded not only the beginning of the
Franco totalitarian regime but also the advent of National Catholicism, which introduced
an era of almost unprecedented Church power in Spain. Though the Church received
benefits fi*om its newly elevated position, much of the objective of National Catholicism,
whose premises included identification of religion with Spanish nationalism, rejection of
liberalism and secularism, and exaltation ofFranco as savior of both the Catholic faith

‘ The working definition ofthe Catholic Church for the purposes of this study is as a political and social
institution that exerts influence over these two spheres. This definition of the Church is distinct from its
definition as a body ofthe faithful and from its definition as a cultural institution.
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and of Spain (Callahan 382), was to legitimize Franco’s totalitarian regime by a strong
association with the Church.
Initial loyalty of the Church to Franco resulted from both the harsh anticlericalism
and war atrocities dealt to it by the Republic and its desire to protect Catholic values in
Spain. Bishop Olaechea stated in an August 23, 1936, address in Pamplona that this (the
Civil War)is not a war that is being waged but a crusade”(Chao Rego 26), a sentiment
echoed by the 1936 Pastoral Letter of Bishop Pla y Deniel ofSalamanca, which stated
that the Republic was “no longer Spain” due to influence by “love of foreign customs”
(Pla y Deniel 704). Cardinal Isadro Goma, archbishop of Toledo and one ofthe
staunchest supporters of National Catholicism, polarized the situation even further: “This
most cruel war is at the bottom a war of principles, of doctrines, of one concept of life
and social situation against another, of one civilization against another. It is a war that
sustains the Christian and Spanish spirit against another spirit... {Iglesia, estadoy
movimiento nacional2\). On July 1, 1937, the Spanish Church hierarchy^ presented for
the first time a unified front declaring its support for the Nationalists, the military faction
led by General Franco during the Civil War,through a collective letter, although it did
not specifically endorse the Franco regime nor

did it declare support for totalitarianism.

However, the clergy did state its belief that the war was an ideological conflict between
Communists and Catholic Spain. Furthermore, it argued that not only did the
Nationalists support a restoration of Spanish values but that the Republic also failed to
observe democratic processes or maintain civil rights(25-29). Furthermore, the
hierarchy stated in the letter that the Church did not believe in war but deemed it
necessary to support Franco’s “civic-military movement”(Payne 175). Through this
^ For the purposes of this study, the hierarchy is defined as the majority consensus opinion of the clergy.

2

endorsement of Franco’s war, if not specifically his idea for a government, the Church
solidified its future position of power within the regime.
From the very beginning ofthe Franco government. Franco made it clear that
restoring Catholic values to Spain would be a focus ofthe regime. In his victory speech
on May 20, 1939, Franco offered a public prayer:

Lord God, in whose hands is right

and all power, lend me thy assistance to lead this people to the full glory of empire, for
thy glory and that ofthe Church. Lord: may all men know Jesus, who is Christ son ofthe
Living God” {Iglesia, estado y movimiento nacional 46). He immediately declared Spain
a Catholic state, later declaring in a 1946 address to Parliament, “the perfect state is for us
the Catholic state”(76). The Traditional Spanish Phalanx, the official state party,
emphasized the committed Catholic character ofthe new state through its statutes, in
which the party stated as its goal the restoration of Spain’s “resolute faith in her Catholic
and imperial mission”(Payne 176). Furthermore, the ecclesiastical budget, which the
Republic dismantled, was resumed in November of 1939(180). Franco also reinstated
Catholic holidays such as Corpus Christi as state holidays (after being removed by the
Second Republic) and restored traditional Catholic symbols in public schools.(173).
Through this establishment of a confessional state, the government gave power to
the Church with respect to many areas of Spain’s operation. Civil authorities were
required to submit to the Church, as were individual citizens(Azpiazu 54), and the
Church occupied a key role in state censorship of publications of nearly every kind,
theatrical performances, and radio addresses(Payne 187). The regime also instated many
laws in accordance with Church doctrine, stating that “it does not suffice for us that a
people be Christian in order to fulfill the moral precepts ofthis order(Catholic state):
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laws are necessary to maintain its principles and correct abuses”(Iglesia, estado y
movimiento nacional 76). Divorce was outlawed in September of 1939(Payne 180), and
the 1943 Law of University Organization assigned “as supreme guide Christian dogma
and the authority ofsacred canons with respect to teaching”(182). Together the laws
established by the Franco regime constituted the broadest assortment of religious
regulations seen in any twentieth-century western state.
However, the Church also afforded Franco some important powers, and Franco
used the Church to legitimize his regime. Bishops praised Franco in public ceremonies,
and he occupied prominent place in official Church ceremonies though early 1960s
(Gomez Perez 134-42). In the agreement of 1941, an accord between Spain and the
Vatican, the Vatican gave the Spanish government the power to make presentations to the
episcopacy, althougli the Church maintained authority over appointments(Payne 180).
The 1953 concordat, which was much more highly sought by Catholic Spam than by the
Vatican, gave the regime even more power (185); it established the fullest recognition of
the regime by the Vatican and gave Franco the right to present bishops (186). These
policies contributed to an intertwining of Church policy and Franco s totalitarian political
system, a dangerous relationship that led to controversy and dissent in later years.
Though the Church held a highly respected position within the regime, they were
not immune to Franco’s repression. During the early years of the dictatorship, Franco
subjected the works of many Church officials to censorship, especially those of nonSpanish officials. Pope Pius XI’s Mit brennender Sorge^ an anti-Nazi encyclical
published during the Spanish Civil War, was banned, and Franco censured a passage in
the Pope’s April 15,1939, congratulatory address to the Nationalists that encouraged
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kindness and goodwill toward the defeated (Payne 180). The regime also repressed
Catholic groups. Catholic student organizations were absorbed by the Falange s Spanish
University Syndicate (Sindicato Espanol Universitario), the regime prohibited Catholic
social groups that competed with state syndicates(Payne 180), and Catholic labor unions
and agricultural workers groups were banned completely(Callahan 385). Some of the
harshest repression ofthe Church occurred in the nationalistic provinces, especially the
Basque country and Catalonia, where priests were forbidden to use the regional
languages in religious ceremonies(Payne 180). Though the regime revoked some of the
repressive measures in later years(most notably lifting censorship of Catholic
publications in 1962), these early conflicts resulted in an often tense relationship between
the Church and Franco, conflicts that served as the the breeding ground for later dissent.
The political and social disagreement within the Church contnbuted to a
significant fragmentation that occuired during the 1960s. One group of bishops remained
loyal to the regime, believing that Franco’s protection and support was the only way to
ensure the Church’s future, while another group of bishops believed that the Church’s
relationship with Franco, and with him his repressive social and political policies, were
destroying it. The late 1950s and early 1960s saw the emergence ofclandestine Christian
Democratic parties, including the Union Democrata Cristiana, which was founded m
1956, and the Democracia Social Cristiana, which was founded in 1960(Callahan 432).
The loss ofthe traditional Catholic voice in the highest circles of the regime further
stimulated this fragmentation. In 1956, Ruiz Gimenez, who supported Catholic power in
education, was removed as the minister of education (Tusell 381-84), and Martin Artajo,
the last Church sympathizer in Franco’s cabinet, was removed in 1957.
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This “old” Catholic power was in large part replaced with that of the Opus Dei.
The Opus Dei, which means Work of God,” was founded in 1928 by Aragonese priest
Jose Maria Escriva de Balaguer(Hooper 176). This select, elitist, highly structured
organization, whose goal is the sanctification of the secular world(Payne 190), was
recognized by the Vatican as a community initiative in 1943 and as the first secular
institute within the Church in 1947(Shubert 244). The Opus Dei selects three categories
of members, numeraries, who are laymembers who take monastic vows,supemumeranes,
who are lay members who may marry and raise families, and clergy. The sect became
hugely Influential in Spain during the 1950s and 1960s, especially in education. During
the 1950s, the organization opened several private residential colleges (colegios mayores-)
and founded the first Catholic university recognized by the regime, the University of
Navarra(Callahan 416). The success ofthe Opus Dei with respect to educational
influence was facilitated by its friendship with education minister Jose Ibanez Martin,
who promoted members to high research positions in universities and secured university
chairs for members; by the time he left office in 1951, Opus members and sympathizers
held between 20 and 25 percent ofthe chairs at Spanish universities(Hooper 177).
Though the organization was(and still is) very Catholic and very conservative, it was
often at odds with the aims ofthe old guard. Catholic Action. Unlike Catholic Action,
the Opus Dei mandated that its members work in the secular world (Callahan 426)and
encouraged membership of economists, engineers and businessmen. As a result, the
organization catalyzed the modernization of Spain, as many ministers belonging to the
Opus Dei initiated economic stabilization and development plans. As a whole, the sect
was also more willing to accept institutional change to pacify European democracies than
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was the old Catholic order(427). Catholic Action saw the Opus Dei as an oftenunwelcome competitor and criticized it for its secrecy and promotion of laity(432).
Furthermore, though Opus Dei was active in the Franco regime, it also contained many
members who were in opposition organizations(Payne 193-194). Thus, the Opus Dei
contributed to the fragmentation of the Catholic Church in Spain both by threatening the
monolithic Catholic power of National Catholicism and by subverting the regime in the
same manner as many non-Opus bishops, by sympathizing with the opposition.
The challenge of regionalism, which had been present from the beginning of the
regime, intensified during the 1950s and 1960s, further contributing to stressed relations
between the Church and the regime. Franco highly repressed regionalist movements,
even in the churches; the regime harassed priests for speaking in the vernacular(Sanchez
Erauskin 162)and mandated that the catechism be taught only in Castilian (Callahan
434). Franco also used government patronage rights to appoint nonnative pro-regime
bishops who would control local clergy. Franco stated upon his appointment of the
bishop of Guipiizcoa, a Basque diocese, that his candidate would speak of God by
speaking of Spain”(Villota Elejalde 466). This repression prompted a backlash by the
nationalistic provinces, particularly in the Basque country, which had sided with the
Republic during the Civil War. Basque clerical exiles began propaganda and lobbying
campaigns outside Spain, which encouraged priests in the Basque country to rebel against
the regime. These efforts included a 1944 petition to the Holy See that asked for a
rejection of government interference in Church affairs and the restoration of the Basque
language to religious services(Callahan 434). In the 1950s, local clergy joined the fray;
Egiz, a church review published in the Basque country, called for Church independence
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and reproached the Church hierarchy for tolerating the regime’s abuses (434-435). In
1960, 339 Basque priests denounced not only the Franco regime but also National
Catholicism itself in an open letter to their bishops, citing “the contradiction existing
between Catholic doctrine with respect to the human person and its lack of fulfillment by
a regime that officially calls itself Catholic and to which the Spanish Catholic hierarchy
has lent its decided support”(“Carta de 339 curas vascos a sus obispos 63). Though the
Catalonian clergy were not as bold as their Basque counterparts in the defiance against
regime repression, their support of autonomy and regional rights also challenged the
status quo. Abbot Aureli Escarre, often called the “spiritual leader of Catalan
Catholicism,” encouraged the use of Catalan in religious services and refused to attend a
reception in Franco’s honor in protest ofthe police torture of autonomy supporters in
Barcelona (Callahan 438). Though this challenge of regionalistic clergy existed,

as did

the clerical dissent mentioned previously, the facade of national Catholicism remained
intact until the 1960s.
During the 1960s and 1970s, increased tension and dissent prepared the Church
for the transition to democracy that occurred later. There was wider and bolder protest by
clergy and an increased focus on social problems; Abbot Escarre criticized the regime
rather audaciously, stating in the November 16, 1963, edition ofthe newspaper Le Monde
that it was a regime that “calls itself Christian and which, nevertheless, does not obey the
basic principles of Christianity”(Callahan 507). There was also intensified clerical
support for regional autonomy, and protests by many Basque and Catalonian clergy
against both human rights violations and repression of nationalist movements. This
defiant attitude was exemplified by the position ofthe religious orders in the monastery
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of Aranzazu who believed that Catholics would not be “true disciples of Christ until they
recognized separatists, Communists and socialists as brothers”(507)and by a protest
march of over 200 priests in Catalonia against the regime’s exclusion of Catalan priests
(517). This spirit of protest foreshadowed the radical reevaluation ofthe Church s role in
society that would follow the sweeping statements made by the Second Vatican Council.
According to Cardinal Tarancon, the roots ofchange in civil-ecclesiastical
relations were in the Second Vatican Council(Martin Descalzo 144). The Second
Vatican Council’s emphasis on religious liberty ofindividuals and of political
independence ofthe Church caused a conflict to arise between the Church s desire to
follow the mandates of conciliar change and its desire to preserve its position in Spain.
over
For example, though the Church supported the end of government patronage rights
appointments(Callahan 515), it also wanted to maintain state financial support and
official confessionality(516). Tarancon’s opinion was not without merit, in 1967,just
two years after the close of the Council, the regime enacted its first law of religious
liberty, which allowed other religious groups to conduct activities, although it did not
permit them to proselytize (514). However, this slight increase in religious freedom was
accompanied by increasing anticlericalism by the regime. In 1967, Franco instituted a
policy of repression against insubordinate clerics, and in 1969 the regime constructed a
special prison in Zamora for convicted priests(518). In the final years ofthe regime,
priests involved in demonstrations and protests were punished with arrests,jail terms, and
fines, actions that never would have occurred at the peak of National Catholicism.
Extreme right-wing religious groups, such as Guerillas of Christ the King, also threatened
priests(Blazquez Carmona 209). Indeed, it was the most dangerous time to be a priest
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since the Civil War. In 1971, the Church realized the great need to have a frank dialogue
among clergy about its opportunities and problems. Thus, a large group of clergy held
the Joint Assembly(Asemblea Conjunta)in Madrid during that year. Though they did
not wish to separate church and state completely (especially due to the financial
implications of that action), they recognized that the Church needed to accept the
impossibility of isolation from the modem world and the need to recogmze the pluralistic
Christianity that was arising due to influence ofother countries and of Vatican-II
(Secretariado Nacional del Clero 33, 35-36). According to Archbishop Tarancon, the
Assembly was the “first public act of the Spanish Church that questioned...the intimate
connection between the Church and the Regime”(Enrique y Tarancon 489).
With this conference, opposition to the regime became even more mainstream
than it was after Vatican-II. New, more liberal bishops were appointed, personified by
Archbishop Tarancon, who supported clerical reform while defending the regime s
legitimacy and supporting the notion that Spain, which was comprised by an immense,
nearly absolute, majority of Catholics,” should remain confessional. That he was
simultaneously in favor of reforms and a friend of the regime made it possible for him to
move the Church away firom the regime without intensely confronting it. This idea of
peaceful reform was jeopardized in 1974 by a crisis that threatened to sever church and
state relations. The crisis arose when Bishop Antonio Anoveros of Bilbao was placed
under house arrest by the regime after he delivered a homily that defended the people’s
right to autonomy. The hierarchy fell solidly in line behind their bishop, and the
government planned a complete break in relations with the Vatican. Consequently,
Archbishop Tarancon prepared a document that excommunicated anyone involved with
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the action against Bishop Anoveras (Callahan 543-544). The crisis was averted only by
the intervention of Franco himself, who in his old age was obsessed with the image of
Catholic Spain (544). The crisis of 1974 arguably marked the beginning of the
hierarchy’s ideological separation from the regime, as opposed to its previous

conscious

distance from it.
During the next year, this rift was apparent, both between the Church and the
regime and even within the church itself. The Spanish Episcopal Conference
(Conferencia Episcopal Espanola)strongly and publicly affirmed human rights

as well as

the freedom of expression of bishops, even with regard to the regime; accompanying this
stance was a far more outward criticism ofFranco’s social injustices(Callahan 545).
With this shift in mainstream Church opinion, reactionary clergy formed pro-regime
groups. most notably the Hermandad Sacerdotal, which contained six thousand pnests
(542). This division between the mainstream hierarchy and the clerical right

was

accompanied by a further decline of Church influence in political policy, especially that
of Opus Dei, which suffered financial scandals and the inevitably subsequent decrease m
power during the early 1970s(Hooper 177-178). This ideological and political
separation ofthe Church with the regime prepared it for the transition to democracy that
followed soon after.
On November 20,1975, Francisco Franco died of natural causes, and Juan Carlos
I immediately succeeded to the throne as king, an action that Franco had dictated before
his death. The king named Arias Navarro as the new prime minister, but his choice
proved to be an unproductive one. Navarro, a Franco sympathizer, wanted the transition
to occur more slowly than did Juan Carlos I; thus the king removed him in 1976, less than
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a year after he was appointed (Wierda and Mott 71). The king then appointed Adolfo
Suarez, a strong supporter of both democracy and Catholicism, as the new prime
minister. Suarez quickly convinced the Franco Parliament to vote itself out of existence,
and the new democracy was bom.
The Church then had to quickly decide what it wanted its role to be in the new
system. These aims were first outlined in a historic sermon by Tarancon that state the
right of“all citizens to participate freely and actively in the life ofthe country and that
the Church wanted nothing more than the right to preach its religious message(Callahan
551-552). During the last half of the 1970s, the Vatican and Spain constmcted a plan for
church and state relations. Through a 1976 agreement with the Vatican, the Spanish
government renounced patronage rights over episcopal appointments, and the Church
renounced the special legal privileges that it had enjoyed (“Acuerdo entre la Santa Sede y
el Estado Espanol” 778-81). The Constitution of 1978 further separated the state from
the Church, declaring in Article 16 that “no confession will have a state character,”
although it amended the statement by maintaining in clause 3 that‘the public powers will
take into account the religious beliefs ofSpanish society and will maintain relations of
cooperation with the Catholic Church and other confessions”(Tamames 36). However,
little of the rest ofthe Constitution took the Church into account, as there was hardly any
incorporation of Catholic moral values into the document(Callahan 568). This blow to
the Church was softened by the 1979 agreements between the Vatican and Spain, which
essentially gave special treatment to the Catholic Church despite the claim by the
Constitution of 1978 that all religious groups would be treated equally. These
agreements asserted the “right ofthe Catholic Church to exercise apostolic mission”
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without interference from the government(555). Although students were no longer
required to attend religion classes, religious education was to continue, with the
assistance of state funding, and one of the agreements gave the Church the right to found
universities (557). Catholics and other religious groups were also allowed to assign a
small portion of their income taxes to the Church, without changing the amount oftaxes
that they paid (558). As the church heavily depends on government support to this day, it
is clear that this measure was not sufficient to provide ecclesiastical finances.
With respect to the political arena, the Church adopted a policy that was later
called “taranconismo,” which is the abandoning of official Christian democracy

in favor

of an “insincere political neutrality”(Callahan 563). Though the hierarchy staunchly
opposed the formation of a Christian Democratic Party due to Vatican II s exhortation of
the independence of the political community and the Church, it did not shy away from
supporting parties that it felt were in line with Christian ideals, namely Suarez s Union of
the Democratic Center {Union de Centro Democrdtico)nor from standing firmly against
Marxists, socialists, and Communists(562). However,the Church s unofficial political
loyalties did little to sway popular opinion; the virtually universally Catholic populace
or
elected the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party {Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol
PSOE)to power in 1982.
With the inauguration ofthe new socialist government,the Church feared that
church and state relations would return to the conflict and anticlericalism of the Second
Republic. These fears were not realized, but the new government’s liberal legislation and
support for decreased Church influence concerning state affairs displeased the hierarchy.
Though the PSOE government accepted the 1970’s acuerdos and the Constitution of
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1978, both of which recognized the special historical relationship that the Church had
with Spain, they also decriminalized abortion and enacted stricter controls over Church
schools and financing, actions that incensed the Church (Callahan 574). One ofthe more
intense confrontations between the Church and the PSOE concerned the Ley Organica de
la Educacion (LODE), a 1983 education law that required all schools receiving state
money to entrust policies to elected councils ofteachers, parents, students, and staff and
forbade requiring attendance at religious services. The Church saw the LODE as an
attack on the Catholic identity of Catholic schools, although the law, which was passed,
did not greatly change the Catholic school system (592). Even less friendly relations
between the Church and the government began during the early 1990s, marked by a 1990
collective statement of bishops that called Spanish society morally infirm, blaming it
on the “anti-religious” socialist government(597). This statement was accompanied by
the refusal of the Church to send a delegation to the twelfth anniversary celebration of the
Constitution of 1978; the government responded by postponing ecclesiastical finance
discussions (597). Periodic crises further intensified this conflict, producing especially
heated debates over new education legislation and the liberalization ofabortion law.
This liberal legislation prompted Christian Democratic groups to incorporate into
the old Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular)^ a right-wing political party at one time
associated with loyalty to Franco, and they renamed it the Popular Party {Partido Popular
or PP), largely to avoid old associations(Callahan 593). The party s leader, Jose Maria
Aznar, met with Spain’s most influential bishops, built good relations with them, and
won their unofficial support(594). The PP won the 1996 election, likely due more to
public disenchantment with the PSOE’s economic policies and corruption than to the
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Church’s influence. Though the PP, which remained in power until the 2004 elections,
supported the Church on moral issues, especially abortion policy, it refused to renegotiate
financial matters (600). Even so, the relationship between the Church and the PP was far
more stable than its wavering relationship with the first PSOE government. Still, the
Church has suffered a blow; its political influence, which was so strong during the Franco
era. has fallen greatly during the years of democracy. This trend is well-illustrated by the
overwhelming victory of the PSOE in the 1982 election and the legalization of abortion
and divorce over the objection of the Church. There are several plausible reasons for this
loss of influence, most evidently the loss ofthe officially esteemed position granted to
them by Franco, a position that was accompanied by positions on the inner circle of
government and direct input concerning legislation. Furthermore, the refusal of the
Church to establish an official Christian party and its adherence to the Second Vatican
Council statement discouraging direct involvement ofthe Church with political
institutions places the Church in the background of political debate, where it is less likely
to make an impact on public opinion, which now, due to the nature of the democratic
system, indirectly guides policy. As a whole, the population is not as sympathetic with
Church opinions as it once was, a trend likely due to both the social liberalization of
Spain and the rest of Western Europe and the association ofthe Church with Franco in
the minds ofthe public.
Accompanying this decline in Church political influence during the transition to
democracy and throughout the 1980s is a remarkable decline in church attendance
throughout Spain during the same period. According to the 1981 European Values
Surveys,41 percent of Spaniards claimed to attend church at least once a week(Abela
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54); this figure dropped to 25 percent in the 1995-1997 World Values Surveys
(Swanbrovv). The most marked decrease was among youth; by 1989, only 15 percent of
young people considered themselves practicing Catholics, reflecting a drop of50 percent
that occurred between 1960 and 1975 (Di'az-Salazar and Giner 95). According to the
1990 World Values Surveys, Spain had the largest age gap in Western Europe between
persons bom between 1960 and 1975 and those bom before 1940 with respect to the
percentage of each group who attended church more than once a month, had confidence
in the Church, and believed that abortion and divorce were unacceptable (Inglehart VI47,
V272, V309). Statistically significant differences also existed between persons bom
before 1940 and persons bom between 1940 and 1960 and between persons bom between
1940 and 1960 and persons bom between 1960 and 1975. According to this data, three
distinct age groups exist(or existed in 1990) with respect to the studied opinions and
practices. How has the diminishing status ofthe Church as a political institution and its
evolving role as a social institution contributed to the development ofthese age-related
differences? The following chapters will show that the evolving status ofthe Catholic
Church in Spain influenced the development ofthese differences by contributing to three
distinct social climates in which the “older” age group (persons bom before 1940),
“middle” age group (persons bom between 1940 and 1960), and “younger” age group
(persons bom between 1960 and 1975)were educated and socialized.^ The aim of this
study is to examine the existence ofthese changes and the relationships that they have
with generational differences in religious practice with respect to two main factors. First,
the decline of political and social influence ofthe Church during the 1960s-1980s created
^ For the purpose of this study, the term socialization is used rather loosely; namely it is defined as the
period of education during approximately the first twenty years after birth during which religious habits and
political convictions are formed.

16

an atmosphere in which people felt freer to differ from the Church in political belief and
in religious practice. Secondly, the fragmentation of the Church that intensified in the
1960s created an atmosphere of pluralistic Catholicism, which contributed to the belief
that people could deviate from official Church doctrine still be “good Catholics,” The
argument will also demonstrate that the Church’s emphasis on the external practice of
religion rather than on internal faith, especially before Vatican II, allowed the formation
of age differences to occur with respect to external religious manifestations instead of
faith in God.
This study will argue that the period ofsocialization for the three age groups fits
fairly well with three distinct periods of Spanish history in which the Church had three
different statuses within society and government. The oldest group grew up primarily
during the reign of Alfonso XIII, the dictatorship ofPrimo de Rivera, and the glory days
of Franco’s National Catholicism, with only a short intervening period of ultimately
unsuccessful democracy. During this time, the Church enjoyed considerable power and
social influence, especially during the first years ofthe Franco regime. The middle group
was socialized approximately during the period of upheaval and dissent between 1960
and the end ofthe regime in 1975, when the Church’s role was begmmng to change but
was still central in Catholic political and social life. However,the youngest group was
socialized more or less during the first fifteen years ofthe democracy, when the edifice of
National Catholicism had fiilly crumbled and the Church was relegated to a peripheral
position in Spanish society.
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Chapter 2: Definition of Cohorts

As stated in the introduction to this study, external religious manifestations,
exemplified in this study by church attendance, confidence in the Church as an
institution, and adherence to Church doctrine with respect to moral convictions,
decreased significantly during the 1980s, most markedly in the younger age groups. In
order to discuss the influence that the evolving status and role ofthe Catholic Church in
Spain has exerted over this “generation gap” it is necessary to define each generation
involved. Between which age groups does the most sizeable difference in opinion and
behavior occur? The following chapter is dedicated to exploring through survey data the
age differences that exist with respect to these questions and to determine the age cutoffs
for the groups that will be studied in subsequent chapters.
The 1990-1993 World Values Surveys offer valuable insight into which age
differences are particularly significant in Spain when compared to those seen in other
Western European countries. Tables 2.1 through 2.5 below group the responses of
Western Europeans to key WVS religion and morality-related questions according to
country and age. The cohorts(16-29 years ofage, 30-49 years of age, and over fifty
years of age)shown are those that were indicated in Human Values and Beliefs, the
published sourcebook for this administration ofthe values surveys. Percentage
differences between the cohorts, the averages ofthese differences, and the standard
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deviations are also shown. “Difl” indicates the percentage difference between the 16-29
cohort and the 30-49 cohort,“dif 2” indicates the percentage difference between the 3049 cohort and the 50+ cohort, and “dif 3” indicates the percentage difference between the
16-29 cohort and the 50+ cohort.

Table 2.1: Percentage of people who attend religious services,
excluding weddings,funerals, and christenings, more than once a
month, 1990-1993 WVS
16-29
Catholic

Mixed

Protestant

Age
30-49

50+

difl

dif2

dif3

Spain

20

33

58

13

25

38

Portugal

31
16
7

58
46

2

Belgium
France

33
25

25
21

27
30

21

Ireland

80
44

31
94
65
42

24
14

Italy
Netherlands
North Ireland

20
57

10
87
48
29
68

Switzerland

28

38

77
53

West Germany
Britain

17

25

51

13

21

32

3

7

22

7

Iceland

11
7

Norway
Sweden

9
9

20
14
18
14

Denmark
Finland

9
10
9

Avg
St.
Dev.

19

9
3
7

7
17
13

21
22

9
15

20
25

26

34

11

19

15

19
9

2

13
5

1

8

7
9

0

5

5

5.4

14.8

20.2

4.6

7.2

9.6

4
9
11
10
8
8
4
-4

Table 2.2: Percentage of people who have "a great deal” or "quite a
lot” of confidence in the church, 1990-1993 WVS
16-29
Catholic

Protestant

50+

difl

dif2

dif3

Spain

27

37

67

10

30

40

Portugal
Belgium
France

42

53

73

10

30

35

43
45

65
65

70
55
28

86
76
47

74

95

8
8
14
1
6
7

20
22

31
38
44

57
53

10
6

62

10

28

51

67
39
33

79
59
50

5
7

Ireland
Mixed

Age
30-49

Italy
Netherlands
North Ireland
West
Germany
Britain
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden

37
56
54
22
67
21
32
34
23
60
33
29

Avg
St.
Dev

20

20

30
28

16
21
19
21

30
22
25

26
15
18

36
21
28

6
4

23
12
20
17

19
26
21

7.5

20.0

27.5

3.1

4.4

5.6

28

28

Table 2.3: Percentage of people who believe that abortion is never
justified, 1990-1993 WVS
Age
16-29 30-49 50+ difl dif2 dif3
18

26

49

8

23

31

Portugal

20

25

39

5

14

19

Belgium
France

16

21

32

11

16

16

12

30

5
-4

18

14

Ireland

43

46

22

23
12

19

3
-4

19

Italy
Netherlands

65
33

14

10

10

19

-2

9

7

North Ireland

33

39

48

6

9

15

Switzerland

44
11

51
12

67
29

7

16

23

1

17

18

15

16

25

1

9

10

8
7

24

-6

16

10

Iceland

14
12

20

13

8

Norway
Sweden

10
11

12
13

23
18

-5
2

13

2

11
5

1.3

13.6

14.9

4.6

■ 4.7

6.8

Catholic Spain

Mixed

West Germany
Protestant Britain
Finland

Avg
St.
Dev

21

7

Table 2.4: Percentage of people who believe that divorce is never
justified, 1990-1993 WVS
Age
16-29 30-49
Catholic Spain
Portugal
Belgium
France
Ireland
Mixed

Italy
Netherlands
North Ireland
Switzerland

West Germany
Protestant Britain
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden

50+

difl

dif2

dif3

8

18

40

10

22

32

11
11

19
14

30
27

8

11

19

6

21
46
30
14

13
12

16
15

16
4

9
22
16
5
22
20
5

3
3

39
37
16

1
2
0
4
4

24
14
9
17
17

25
16
9
21
21

1

11

12

8

8

19

0

11

11

13
7
6
11
7

14
4

23

1

9

10

15

-3

11

8

3
14

8
20
11

-3
3
2

5

2

6
2

9
4

2.3

12.1

14.4

3.4

5.8

7.9

21
14
5
18

9
Avg
St.
Dev

22

Table 2.5: Percentage of people who believe that God exists, 1990-1993
WVS

Catholic Spain
Portugal
Belgium
France
Ireland
Mixed

Italy
Netherlands
North Ireland

West Germany
Protestant Britain
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden

16-29
78
75
51
51
95
89
52
96
62
63
50
57
78
53
34

Age
30-49 50+ difl dif2 dif3
82
94
4
12
16
13
6
94
19
88
17
13
68
81
30
4
22
55
77
26
3
1
4
99
98
-1
94
6
88
5
14
75
9
23
66
99
-1
4
3
95
13
14
27
75
89
89
13
76
13
26
82
8
24
32
58
89
19
13
32
76
95
6
11
17
84
25
7
18
60
78
62
22
40
6
28
Avg
St.
Dev

8.3

12.5

20.9

6.2

6.8

10.0

Several generational differences prove remarkable (defined for these purposes to
be greater than one standard deviation above the mean). According to Table 2.1, all three
age differences studied are greater in Spain than one standard deviation above the mean
for Western Europe. The percentage difference in confidence in the church (Table 2.2) is
not significant between the younger and middle age groups but is quite significant
between both the middle and older age groups and the younger and older age groups
(greater than two standard deviations above the mean in both cases). With respect to the
abortion question (Table 2.3), the percent difference is significant in all three ofthe age
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differences with the most significant differences(two or greater standard deviations
above the mean) existing between the middle and older age groups and between the
younger and older age groups. The divorce question (Table 2.4) deviates from the
previous questions in that, though all age differences studied are significantly higher in
Spain than the mean for Western Europe, the differences between the younger and middle
age groups and the younger and older age groups are the highest, greater than two
standard deviations above the mean.
Tables 2.1 through 2.4 clearly show that it is not sufficient to view the generation
gap as a difference between an older and younger generation, at least with respect to
“extemar’ religiosity as indicated by church attendance, confidence in the institution, and
moral opinions that conform to Church doctrine. Instead, there appear to be three distinct
groups, those bom before 1940, those bom between 1940 and 1960, and those bom
between 1960 and 1975; the differences between all three age groups with respect to the
studied factors are significantly higher in Spain than the averages for Western Europe.
The WVS data cannot shed light on the possibility ofa fourth group bom after 1975,
thus, the youngest age group cannot be defined as simply as those bom after 1960 using
only this data.
Table 2.5 shows a stark contrast to the previous four tables. Not only are the age
differences among all three groups insignificant in Spain (less than one standard
deviation on either side of the mean)for beliefin the existence of God,they are below the
mean differences for Western Europe. This data clearly supports the idea that the
generation gaps exist with respect to external religious manifestations and rather than
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with respect to inner belief and faith, an idea that is quite consistent with the thesis
statement.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2, which summarize statistics from the Fundacion Santa Maria,
also support the validity of these generation gaps (Villalam Benito et al, 38-39) with
respect to adherence of moral convictions to teachings of the Church. They form smaller
cohorts with narrower age ranges to pinpoint age differences. The graphs represent
indices ofjustification of divorce and abortion in 1981 and 1990. The index is between
one and ten, with one representing a minimal level ofjustification and ten representing a
maximum level.
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The statistics from 1981 show a clear drop in justification ofboth abortion and
divorce between the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups, or between those persons bom before
and after 1945. Ten years later, the large drop in justification ofboth abortion and
divorce is maintained between the 35-44 and 45-54 cohorts, which indicates that the gap
was maintained between the same groups over the decade. It is of note that the divorce
curve for 1981 has a more gradual drop in justification than does the abortion curve,
which adopts a less sharp distinction between the younger and older cohorts in 1990.
These statistics support the WVS data that indicates significant generational differences
between persons bom before 1940 and those persons bom after, although the years do not
match up exactly due to the age groups fonned by the different surveys.
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Other statistics support the validity of this generation gap and, furthermore, its
maintenance through the 1990s. The Center of Sociological Investigations {Centro de
Invcstigacioncs Sociologicas). a team based in Madrid that studies Spanish society
through public opinion sur\'cys, has conducted polls addressing generational differences
with respect to religious practice and moral opinion. In December of 1995, the group
published the results of a poll that studied attitudes of the Spanish population with respect
to moral questions and personal satisfaction. Figure 2.3 groups the responses to some of
these questions in age cohorts.

Figure 2.3: Social Attitudes of the Spanish Population, 1995
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For both questions, the opinion countering Church doctrine (supporting divorce
and abortion) is highest for the 18-24, 25-34, and 35-44 age cohorts, or for people bom
after 1955. For the divorce question, dissenting opinion also is strong for the 45-54 age
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cohort, or people bom after 1945; this finding detracts somewhat from the WYS data.
Nonetheless, the data supports the existence ofa significant difference in opinion
between persons bom after 1955 and persons bom before 1945, These definitions of
generations are similar to those supported by the World Values Survey, which indicates
clear statistical differences between people bom before 1940 and after 1960.
It is difficult to define age groups exactly due to the different age ranges and time
periods during which different surveys were administered. Nevertheless, the surveys
the World Values
examined during this chapter compliment each other well and support
Surveys data. Due to the precedence of using World Values Surveys data to support
academic articles (Abela, Halman and Pettersson, Procter and Homsby-Smith, Ester and
Halman, Dobbelaere)concerning religious sociology, the age groups will be formally
defined using the WVS data. Thus, the age groups are defined as follows: persons bom
before 1940, persons bom between 1940 and 1960, and persons bom between 1960 and
1975. These age groups will form the framework for studying the relationship between
the factors cited in the introduction and the differences in external religious expression
among the cohorts.
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Chapter 3: The Declining Political and Social Status ofthe Spanish Church

During Franco’s dictatorship, especially during the first two decades ofthe
regime, the Spanish Church possessed a degree of power that it had not enjoyed for
centuries. Franco believed that he was ordained to deliver his country from democracy
and socialism, which were both evil movements in his eyes, to Catholicism and Castilian
tradition. Thus, the Catholic Church held a high position in his regime, and Catholic
doctrine was essentially converted into Spanish law. The Church itself also expected the
State to cooperate with its agenda; in 1939, Father Joaquin Azpiazu declared that the
Catholic State...has to do whatever is necessary so that the Church’s legislation is
perfectly fulfilled”(Azpiazu 31). In accordance with this attitude, the state mandated
many Catholic practices. For example, the regime required that all state leaders profess
Catholicism (Perez-Diaz 134), and Catholic feasts were made public holidays(Lannon
218). Furthermore, the state gave canonical marriage full authority(Payne 186)and
enforced an old Restoration law that required workers to be given time off to attend Mass
(Callahan 464). Franco also esteemed the Church by awarding them prominent positions
in his cabinet. For example, he appointed Martin Artajo, the head of Catholic Action
during the beginning of the regime, as the first foreign minister, and another Catholic
leader headed up public works. These appointments built the Church hierarchy into state
leadership for the first time since the early nineteenth century(Payne 185).
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The regime also afforded the Church an extraordinary degree offreedom during
its first years, freedom that was especially remarkable considering the totalitarian
government. Though Franco censored the Church to a small extent, it suffered much less
repression than did other groups and individuals; Franco could notjustify repressing an
institution around which he shaped his “crusade.” Furthermore, the regime gave the
Church the power to control much of the censorship. For example. Franco appointed
priests to the censoring committees; the first priest was named to the official filmcensoring agency in 1943(Callahan 468). The Vatican also gave the Church the liberty
to form an intimate association with a totalitarian government that often treated its people
in an “unchristian” manner. This rather intentional oversight occurred largely because
the Church leadership in Rome was preoccupied with recovering fi'om WWI and facing
its own instabilities; thus it sympathized with the struggles ofthe Spanish Church and
overlooked the social ills of the Franco dictatorship (Perez-Diaz 143). As a result, for
several years the Church was free to push its agenda without sanction fi'om the regime
and without criticism from the Vatican.
This freedom afforded to the Catholic Church was complimented by a severe
repression of non-Catholic groups by the government. Protestants, Freemasons,
Marxists, and persons simply not confessing the Catholic faith were banned firom
teaching posts, censored, harassed, and ostracized from social, political, and business
spheres (Perez-Diaz 132), For example, Madrid police prohibited a meeting of Jewish
leaders in a private meeting room in September of 1954(Delpech 27). The regime also
closed Protestant schools and most Protestant churches, and, with the exception of those
living in Madrid and a few other towns, all Protestants had to meet secretly to worship
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(41). This repression of groups opposed to the Catholic Church allowed the Church to
impose its doctrine on the Spanish people without resistance; it made the Church the only
moral voice.
The Church exerted this moral monopoly in the education of Spain’s young
people. Franco gave it control and surveillance over moral and religious teaching in all
educational establishments, the power to appoint teachers ofreligion in state schools, and
the authority to run its own schools(Perez-Diaz 132-133). In 1943, the Church created
colegios mayores, residence halls with some teaching functions and firm moral guidance
that were often run by members of Opus Dei or the religious orders(Lannon 221).
Indeed, in the 1940s and 1950s, the Church held even more power in education than they
had in pre-Republic Spain. In 1961, the high point of Catholic school attendance, fortynine percent of Spanish secondary school students attended Catholic schools, and high
attendance was sustained even through the mid-1970s; nearly two million students were
enrolled in Catholic primary and secondary schools in 1976(Callahan 556). As a result
ofthe Church’s control over education during the Franco era, it likely exerted
considerable influence over the moral development ofchildren and young adults who
attended school during these years.
There is considerable evidence that the Church used its new increase in power to
exert a growth in external religiosity in Spain. For example,the reception of the last
sacraments in the Catalan industrial city of Mataro increased from 32.3 percent in 1940 to
57.5 percent just five years later(Duocastella 291). During 1941, the proportion of
residents of Chamartin, a parish in Madrid, who fulfilled the Easter communion
obligation increased from 16.6 percent to 41 percent(Callahan 469). Between 1939 and
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1945, attendance at Sunday mass in the working-class districts of Madrid increased from
6 percent to 18 percent of the populace(469). It is highly unlikely that these large and
rapid changes in external religiosity were due to a sudden revival of faith; instead, it
makes more sense that the newly exalted political status ofthe Catholic Church bestowed
by the Franco regime gave the Church the power and visibility to affect an increase in
ritualistic behavior.
During the later years of the regime and the early years ofthe democracy, the
Church’s political power diminished greatly; there are several reasons why this decline
occurred. A generation came of age that did not remember the Civil War or its old
ideological battles(Wiarda and Mott 57), did not identify with either ofthe factions, and
dared to question the validity ofthe regime and ofthe Church. The rise ofthis generation
brought forward an increase in the resistance of“civil society” and an emergence of a
political class that did not directly descend from the Nationalists or the Republicans
(Perez-Diaz 145). Part of the reason that the Church was so successful in evangelizing
during the era of National Catholicism was that they proposed the idea ofa national
moral community, and many people craved this unity after the suffering and disunity of
the civil war(139). However, this new political class did not understand Franco s old
argument that National Catholicism was necessary for political unity; thus, the
justification for political power ofthe Church was greatly weakened. During the
transition to democracy, the actions ofthe hierarchy itself further weakened the political
status of the Church. In the spirit of Vatican-II, the Church decided not to form an
official Christian Democratic Party; Cardinal Tarancon opposed vehemently the
formation of a confessional party, saying,“When that (direct political involvement)
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enters the Church, it is death”(Martin Descalzo 252-53). As a result, the institution had
and continues to have much less direct say in the political discourse as it would have had
there been an official Christian voice in the government.
This decrease in political power occurred concurrently with a decline in the social
influence of the Church. This weakening in social influence was in part caused by the
economic growth experienced by Spain during the 1960s and 1970s. At the beginning of
the 1960s, the population was 70 percent rural; by the early seventies it was seventy
percent urban (Wiarda and Mott 56). As a result, money and material possessions began
to fulfill the well-being of the Spanish people, making religion less relevant and causing a
rejection ofthe asceticism that the Church so actively promoted (Perez-Diaz 151). The
“Western”(United States and Western European)influences felt by the Spanish society
after the easing of international diplomatic relations also played a large part in the
decrease of the social influence ofthe Church, Spanish teenagers did not care about
political conflicts, ideological disputes, or religion; they just wanted to live a freer
lifestyle with “rock music, blue jeans, and Coca-Cola”(Wiarda and Mott 57). Tourism
and travel also brought secular and looser social norms to Spain during the 1960s. Not
only did Northern Europeans frequent Spanish beaches with their “free”(and often nude)
behavior, which impacted considerably local behavior, but Spanish citizens also traveled
across the border to France to see prohibited films(57), many of which featured material
that the Church likely would have deemed morally inappropriate.
In Spain, where the Catholic Church has been both a political and social
institution for centuries, it makes sense that the political power and social influence of the
Church are almost inextricably linked. Dicey’s study, the Sociology ofLaw, states that
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the true importance of laws lies more in their effects on public opinion than on their
direct actions (Iglesias de Ussel 63), and this principle is well-illustrated by the influence
that the debate in the political arena concerning the decriminalization of abortion had on
the public opinion in Spain. Abortion had never been legalized in the country, even
during the years of the Second Republic(Bodelon Gonzalez 229), but in the years
following Franco’s death an intense debate ensued over the subject. The position of the
Catholic Church is clear on this subject; its position is that life begins at conception, and
abortion is homicide. The Church maintains that abortion is only acceptable to preserve
the mother’s physical health in cases such as ectopic pregnancy and uterine cancer
(Hernandez Rodriguez 125-127). However, in the years following Franco’s death, public
opinion moved away from adherence to Church doctrine and showed the influences of
other political groups.
This influence began during the initial process of democratization. Table 3.1
shows the drastic change in abortion opinion during the first months ofthe UCD
government and the movement toward democracy.

Table 3.1: Public Opinion Concerning Abortion, April 1976-December
1977
December
April
October
1977
1976
1976
Opinion
Abortion should continue to be
44
25
23
prohibited
Abortion should be allowed if
41
57
49
necessary
11
15
19
Abortion should always be allowed
4
5
7
No opinion/no answer
(Iglesias de Ussel 67)
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It is likely that this change in opinion is more than a reflection ofthe people feeling freer
to express their true opinion, though some ofthe change is possibly due to this lifting of
the “culture of fear.” After all, the question is first posed five months after the death of
Franco and is asked next only six months later. This period oftime coincides with the
first debates concerning the constitution and also with the Church’s retreat from official
political debate. Although the UCD did receive an unofficial endorsement by the Church
and also supported the Church’s stance on abortion, the Church did little to fight for the
inclusion of language against abortion in the Constitution. At the same time, liberal and
socialist views were moving to the forefront and becoming more popular. The absence of
the Church from the political arena allowed public opinion to be greater influenced by
dissenting views, and it is highly likely that this influence contributed to the quick change
in public opinion that occurred during 1976.
However, even in 1983 a study by the Spanish sociologist V^quez indicated that
Spanish society appeared to be against abortion(V^quez 197). He supported the
findings of his study with the “slant”(pro- or anti-abortion)shown by clippings of
Spain’s major newspapers during the abortion debate ofthe first four months of 1983.
80.7 percent of the clippings and 78.5% of news articles(these excluded editorials and
advertisements) had an anti-abortion slant during the study period (38, 79), and all of the
major newspapers printed a declaration ofthe Spanish bishops standing against the
decriminalization ofabortion. The declaration called Catholics to defend their beliefs
and declared that abortion was, in their view, homicide:“He who is on the way to being a
man already is one.” It also dismissed the idea that a fetus was only a part of a woman’s
body. Only one newspaper,El Pais, cast the declaration in an unfavorable light (63-69).
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However, this study also indicated that the people in the political arena were more likely
to support abortion in tenns of newspaper citations. Figure 3.1 shows the five
“categories" of people most cited as supporting abortion during the first four months of
1983 and their relative distribution; Figure 3.2 shows distribution ofthe seven
categories" of people most cited as opposing abortion during this same period. As both
figures indicate only the most cited groups, the percentages do not equal 100 percent.
The data for both figures is taken from Vazquez’s study, page 39.

Spanish
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Spanish

These figures support several ideas. First of all, the political voice, at least that
which was shown in newspapers, was mostly pro-abortion, even though the society as a
whole appeared to oppose abortion. If both the representatives of political parties and
government officials are included, fully 39 percent of the people represented as
supporting abortion in the Spanish newspapers was involved with government or politics.
On the other hand, the ecclesiastical hierarchies appear to have had a relatively weak
voice in the political discourse, representing only twelve percent of the anti-abortion
citations in the newspapers. It is important to note that this study of newspapers included
publications of liberal, conservative and neutral political orientations; thus, it is unlikely
that a political bias can be implicated in these findings.
It is important to keep in mind that the Socialist party, the PSOE, had recently
won the 1982 elections and was the majority party in the government. Thus it makes
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sense that the party and its supporters, which firmly supported the decriminalization of
abortion, were most visible as a political presence. Table 3.2 shows the position
concerning abortion of the major political parties and religious groups during the first
four months of 1983.

Table 3.2: Position concerning depenalization of abortion of major political
and religious groups, 1983
Sector
Abortion Stance
Favored
Government
depenalization
Political parties
Favored
PSOE
Juventudes Socialistas
PCE

depenalization
Free abortion
Free abortion
Free abortion
Free abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion

Liga Comunista Revolucionaria
Euskadiko Ezquerra
Alianza Popular
P.D.P.
Liberal Union
Democratic Union of Catalonia
Basque Senators
Traditionalist-Carlist Communion
FET de la JONS
Church groups
Permanent Commission ofthe Spanish Episcopal
Confederation
Catholic bishops
Orthodox Church
Anglican Church
Lutheran Church
Reformed Spanish Church
Episcopal Church
Spanish Evangelical Church
Baptist Union
Adventist Church
(Vazquez)
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Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion
Anti-abortion

In 1985, the Spanish government passed a law that partially decriminalized
abortion, allowing abortions to be performed on the following grounds: danger to the
physical and mental health of the pregnant woman,rape(within twelve weeks of
conception), or fetal abnormality (within twenty-two weeks of conception). It is true that
this abortion law regulates abortion far more strictly than the free abortion statutes in
other European countries; for example,a physician’s approval is required for the physical
or mental health case, and a rape must be reported before an abortion is sought(Rolston
and Eggert xxvii). Nevertheless, the new law allowed abortion to some degree,
something that was virtually unimaginable during the previous eras of Spanish history.
The abortion law and the 1981 law legalizing divorce specifically defied the doctrine of
the Catholic Church, an institution omnipresent in Spanish policy since the country s
creation.
This case clearly illustrates the decline of political power ofthe Catholic Church,
and it also shows that the diminishing social influence ofthe Church was related to
decreased political influence. Though the majority of Spaniards stood against abortion

as

late as two years before the passage ofthe new abortion law, its opinion overall appeared
to conform to the overriding opinion in government within a few years. According to the
1990-1993 WVS,86 percent ofSpaniards approved of abortion when the mother’s health
was at risk, and 76 percent approved eugenic abortion (higlehart, Basanez and Moreno
V237-V238); it is under these criteria that abortion is permitted in Spain under current
law. This relatively quick shift in opinion supports the idea that the Church’s retreat from
an official political role allowed other institutions, namely the socialist government, to
exert a stronger influence over the opinions ofthe Spanish people. According to Hooper,
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the Church “does not have either the moral authority or the political means with which to
intervene directly in politics’'(182). How,then, did these concurrent forces contribute to
the formation of the generation gap? There appear to be three distinct time periods with
respect to the Church’s role in the Spanish political system, and these time periods
coincide well with the socialization ofthe three proposed age groups. Between 1940 and
1960, National Catholicism reigned supreme and was questioned little by the public.
This period, when the Church held important positions in government and exerted
extensive control over the educational system, was also the period in which many ofthe
people bom before 1940(the oldest age group) were educated and socialized, especially
those who were still alive to answer the 1990 World Values Surveys. Between 1960 and
1980, the Church began to lose some official power through the loss ofcabinet positions,
laws granting partial religious liberty, the transition to democracy, and the rise of a new
political class not attached to the ideological battles ofthe Civil War. However, they still
retained extensive power in the educational system and in their symbolic attachment to
the political regime. This period of intermediate power corresponds approximately to the
time when the second age group, those bom between 1940 and 1960, were educated and
socialized. This group also displays an external religiosity that is intermediate to the
older and younger groups. During the 1980s, democracy was in full swing, the Church
had retreated from official politics, and,though they still largely controlled religious
classes in schools, laws had been passed to decrease Church power in the educational
system. These years correspond approximately to the years when the third age group,the
age group that displays the least degree of external religiosity and the greatest deviation
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from C'hurch doctrine with respect to abortion and divorce opinion, was educated and
socialized.
It is important to note that this correspondence does not imply a simple causal
relationship between the political and social status ofthe Church and external religiosity.
There were obviously many factors that contributed to the formation ofthese age-related
differences, notably the rise of dissent and pluralism within the Church, a factor that will
be discussed in the next chapter. However, the data shows that at the very least, the
decline in the status of the Church in Spain exerted considerable influence over external
religiosity and over adherence to Church doctrine concerning moral opinions. The
Catholic bishops themselves asserted this argument; in the 1980s they blamed
government policies for the development of a morally loose society as evidenced in the
advance in sexual permissiveness and decline in religious practice(Callahan 575). This
evidence, correlated with the three political/religious climates previously mentioned,
supports the argument that the political status of the Church and its accompanying social
influence play an important role in the formation ofthe age-related differences already
well-demonstrated by statistical data.

41

Chapter 4: Clerical Fragmentation and Emerging Pluralism

“Leaders! Unfurl the sails of Catholicism! Let there be no law, no chair, no
institution, no newspaper beyond or against God and His Church in Spain! (Laboa 144).
This cry by Cardinal Goma embodies the spirit of unity keenly experienced by the
Spanish Church during the early years ofthe Franco regime. There are several reasons
for this unity, reasons that are rooted both in the political climate ofthe time and in the
Church’s coinciding spiritual mission. The Church was united behind Franco and
supported the Nationalists in the Civil War,largely because it viewed the war as a
crusade against forces antagonistic to Catholicism, such as socialism and Marxism. This
virtually unchallenged support was exemplified by the “Collective Letter issued by the
hierarchy in 1937^ and by a 1941 letter by Pla y Deniel,“Triumph ofthe City of God and
the Resurrection ofSpain,” in which he affirmed the necessity of“abandoning the
principles of political and doctrinal liberalism that has led (Spain)to ruin and demanded
“a rigorous disinfecting...of corrupt doctrines” among “the misguided masses (Tello
Lazaro 110). In short, official Church opinion named the Republicans as enemies of
Christianity and Franco as the savior ofthe faith. This mixture ofreligious and
nationalistic values, aptly represented by the popular motto,“One Caudillo, one faith, and
advance in the name of God and eternal Spain”(Callahan 386), was a unifying factor in
the Spanish Church.
See Chapter 1, page 2.
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Running concurrently with the loyalty ofthe Church to Franco was its desire to
reevangelize the masses through total, unquestioned religiosity. The Church as a whole
saw its increased power as an opportunity to save souls and fulfill its dream to restore
monolithic unity to Catholicism. As a result, the Church bishops and parish priests
unified behind this goal, as evidenced by the increased effort by the Church to be known
in nearly all aspects of Spanish life. The “popular missions” of mass evangelizing, which
began in 1942 and lasted well into the 1950s, were likely the largest evangelistic
exercises, in terms of numbers of nominal participants, yet seen in the twentieth century
(Payne 182). The 1940s also witnessed the return of religion to most official aspects of
Spanish life, such as holidays, festivals, and social organizations.
“Religion was a natural part ofsocial life: Christmas, with its nativity scenes and
processions of the Wise Men; Lenten conferences and open or closed spiritua
exercises; Novenas; the processions ofSemana Santa; the processions ofthe
Sacred Heart of Jesus; pilgrimages to the Virgin; festivals of patron saints; the
religious activities of confraternities and brotherhoods...The
year was
accompanied by some form of public religious manifestation... (Gomez Perez
156),
During the 1940s and 1950s, the private sphere was filled with intervention by the
Church, including “spiritual exercises,” {ejercicios espirituales), exercises for improving
the world (ejercitaciones para un mundo mejor\ short courses on Christianity(cursillos
de Christiandad), retreats, days of meditation, and devout evenings(Perez-Diaz 144).
Through these activities, tens of thousands ofpeople received religious education or were
spiritually reeducated, and this effort was reflected in attendance at Sunday mass, which
increased until the 1960s(Perez-Diaz 139). Though these practices seemed to revive the
religious tradition in Spain for a short period oftime, the Church’s dream of unwavering
Spanish Catholicism would not be fulfilled.
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Even during the peak of National Catholicism, church and state relations were
beginning to change, although the effects of these changes were manifested to a greater
degree in later years. Early disagreements were largely concerned with a struggle on
behalf of the Church for more power rather than with a criticism of Franco’s social
policies. For example, several bishops opposed restrictions imposed on the liberty ofthe
Church by Franco, especially with respect to censorship of Church publications. Pla y
Deniel, the primatial see of Toledo and an early supporter ofFranco’s “crusade,” was one
of the most vocal critics of the regime’s policies with respect to Church power and
liberty. During the 1940s, he waged a behind-the-scenes campaign against church
censorship and protested the exclusion ofthe Church from social action among industrial
workers. When he disapproved ofa 1945 draft law on primary education that gave the
Church less power than expected, he threatened to resign from parliament and attack the
legislation in public if the draft was not changed (Hughes 65). His commitment to the
liberty of the Church and his criticism ofthe regime’s control ofit were exemplified by
his pastoral letter published in Ecclesia on August 28,1945,that stated that the Church
subject to the civil power...cannot be the true Church founded by Christ (Callahan 401).
Spain’s false neutrality during World War II also provoked intense disagreement
among the bishops, many of whom feared that Falange Spain resembled Nazi Germany.
A 1941 letter of Bishop Fidel Garcia Martinez of Calahorra that strongly denounced
Nazism typified this fear. However, Garcia Martinez appeared to be in the minority with
respect to his public disapproval of Nazism; very few bishops with dissenting opinions of
the war discussed their views openly. Furthermore, there was significant Church support
for the regime’s intimate ties with the Nazis. In 1941, Ecclesia^ the official journal of

44

Catholic Action, the political wing ofthe Spanish Church, praised Catholics who fought
for the Blue Division, the Spanish military unit that fought alongside the Nazis, and
called the German offensive on Russia “a new episode ofour crusade...the continuation
of the work of defending the Cross”(Callahan 394). It is clear that the apprehension and
dissent of individual Spanish clergy was fairly internal during this time; publicly the
Church as an institution was still firmly behind Franco. It remained silent in the face of
the social ills perpetuated by the regime during the 1940s and 1950s, namely the periodic
campaigns of violence, arrests, and imprisonment against religious dissenters, especially
Protestants (403). This official loyalty was largely due to the timidity ofthe hierarchy,
which did not want to place the many gains afforded to them by the regime at risk, along
with the perceived threat posed by the tiny non-Catholic minority. However,the early
disagreements that appeared during the first two decades ofthe Franco regime laid the
groundwork for the further polarization of dissent driven by the emergence ofsocial
Catholicism in the 1960s.
This new dissent was different in that it criticized Franco’s social policies instead
of merely how the regime treated the Church. The Church rebelled against Franco s
limiting its power to the religious sphere and dismissing its involvement in social,
economic or foreign policy; indeed, the Church had a more

limited institutional role in

non-religious affairs than it had during Restoration, the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, or
even during the Second Republic(Callahan 385). Thus, many ofthe clergy began to ask
themselves if the regime’s policies agreed with the Church’s social doctrine. For
example, Angel Herrera, the cardinal and bishop of Malaga during the 1960s, noted a
glaring contradiction between Catholic principles and the lack of their application on
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practical level, especially with respect to social policy(385). These questions led to the
movement within the Spanish Church known as social Catholicism, a movement defined
by the Church’s involvement in workers groups and social organizations and in its
mission to reform Spanish public policy. Started by individual bishops rather than by the
hierarchy as a whole, social Catholicism was fueled by the view that the regime s
economic policies intensified class inequalities. Largely due to a lack of church
attendance among the working classes, these priests believed that social improvements
were necessary to ensure the future of Catholicism in Spain (Martinez Lozano 191-192).
Thus, one of the foremost goals of social Catholicism was to re-Christianize alienated
workers through religious and social activities, in part because the hierarchy believed that
these activities were necessary to stop the workers from turning to Marxism, a movement
which it saw as utterly dangerous to the success of the Church (Payne 193). Despite this
initial goal, these Catholic workers groups, such as the Hermandades Obreras de Accion
Catolica and the Juventud Obrera Catolica, often served as bases for Communism in
Spain. Though these groups avoided prohibition by the regime through the protection of
individual bishops and of Catholic Action, the political wing ofthe Spanish Church,they
joined in illegal strikes and worked with Communist and socialist labor unions(Callahan
421). Clergy also sympathized with illegal workers’ movements; by the mid-1960s so
many priests were involved in illegal union activities that the regime had to build a
special prison to contain them (Shubert 236). The rise ofsocial Catholicism and the
sympathy ofsome Catholic groups and clergy with socialist movements were clear
indications that the regime and Church were beginning to divide significantly over social
justice.
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This division over social policy intensified as a result of the revolutionary
opinions set forth during the Second Vatican Council. Even before the Council, preludes
to its effects were evident. The first International Catholic Conversations at San
Sebastian were held in 1948 and continued for a short period; these conferences
encouraged “a Catholicism independent from the official”(Aranguren 77). Carlos
Santamaria, a prominent figure in the Conversations, emphasized that the Church needed
to shift focus from “Christianization of stmetures” to “Christianization ofsouls
(Callahan 494). However, these preliminary views were not stated on an international
level until the Second Vatican Council, which took place between 1962 and 1965.
Vatican-Il challenged the legitimacy of a close relationship between church and state and
for the first time accepted religious liberty as respecting the dignity ofindividuals
(Flannery 800). Article 76 of the conciliar documents stated firmly that the Church
should not be “bound by ties to any political system” and that all citizens should have the
right to participate in the political community and in the governing ofthe state(984), and
Article 68 stressed the right of citizens to free and independent labor unions(974). These
articles, among many others, criticized large parts ofFranco’s social and political
policies, albeit indirectly. An anonymous pamphlet directed at the bishops attending the
Council criticized Franco much more openly, indicting the regime for abuse of human
rights and imploring that the Spanish Church stop being a “propaganda instrument
(Callahan 511). The effects of the Council were wide-reaching; by challenging the
historically inseverable relationship between Spain and the Catholic Church, Vatican II
threatened the very existence of National Catholicism.
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Not only did the criticisms of the regime made by the Council validate political
dissent on the part of the Spanish clergy, but the Council also revolutionized the Church’s
approach to evangelism. Vatican II challenged the idea that the Church rites were
divinely inspired and immutable and encouraged the modification or elimination of
“anachronistic” practices (Behar 103). It also supported a more personal approach to
religious life instead of emphasizing external manifestations ofreligion; in Spain, this
translated into a major emphasis on Bible distribution for first time since the early
sixteenth century—more Bibles were distributed in Spain during the last twenty years of
the Franco regime than during the rest of Spanish history(Payne 193).
These political, social and moral currents of dissent caused a fi:agmentation ofthe
Spanish Church that began in the 1960s. Part ofthe clergy remained loyal to Franco,
notably the pro-regime Hermandad Sacerdotal del Clero, who grumbled that Spain was
being de-Christianized because the Spanish hierarchy had distanced itself fi'om the
regime and Franco, the providential Caudilld*'(Callahan 531). However, many others,
especially parish priests, had dissenting views. This fragmentation was visible even in
the makeup ofthe Vatican Council’s Spanish episcopal delegation, which formed three
distinct sectors. Though a majority of the delegation represented ultraconservative,
elderly bishops, a small minority was committed to conciliar reform and a considerable
number of bishops was dedicated to seeking middle ground (Ruiz Rico 188). It is
important to note that even in the early years ofthe regime clergy in the Basque and
Catalonian autonomous regions represented an openly dissenting sector ofthe Spanish
Church; however, the fragmentation ofthe Spanish Church as a whole did not take place
until the 1960s.
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The most remarkable division among the clergy grew between the older bishops
and the young priests. Much as a political class detached from the memories ofthe Civil
War arose in the 1960s, new clerics emerged simultaneously who did not remember the
old battles between the Church and the “evils” of republicanism and socialism. Inspired
by the Vatican Council, younger clergy began to passionately embrace the idea ofliving
“closer to the actual world and secular culture”(Callahan 614), which brought them into
contact and in sympathy with dissenting political groups. This trend was revolutionaiy at
the time; before the 1960s, clergy tended to live in isolation to avoid being corrupted by
the masses. A different educational atmosphere also influenced this new clerical
generation. Whereas previous generations ofclergy were educated almost solely in
Spanish seminaries, many clerical students in the 1950s(who then joined the clergy in
the 1960s) studied in other countries, especially in Germany(Callahan 493). During this
period, the publication of foreign translated theological works also increased
dramatically. In 1950, 70 percent of religious works published in Spam were wntten by
Spanish authors, but this figure had dropped to 52 percent by 1965. With respect to
works dealing strictly with theology, the increase in translated works was even more
dramatic; between 1950 and 1955 the percentage oftranslated works increased from 25
to 62 percent(Gestiera Garza 124). These translations tended to support a more reformist
view of the Church, which caused many seminary students to adopt a more open
worldview that supported cooperation between priests and their parishioners, a view that
was sharply opposed to the older mentality that supported hierarchal dominance,
suspicion of secular values, and Spanish isolation.
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This new worldview manifested itself in a sweeping change ofclerical opinion
during the 1960s; widespread dissent was no longer limited to the Basque and Catalonian
clergy. By 1975, a majority of bishops and clergy believed that the country required
political refomi (Callahan 527). Concurrent with the growing dissent by the clergy as a
whole was a growing division of political opinion between the older and younger clergy.
A survey conducted in 1970 indicated that 62 percent ofthe clergy and 85 percent of
clergy under the age of 30 disagreed with Church policy concerning social and political
questions (Shubert 236). Another 1970 survey of approximately 80 percent ofthe
country’s clergy reported that 24.8 percent of all priests and 47.2 percent of younger
priests supported socialism (Secretariado Nacional del Clero 109), while only 3.9 percent
of older clergy were in favor of it. The reverse was true for support ofthe monarchy.
Table 4.1 summarizes the data for this survey.

Table 4A: Political preferences of 15,449 Spanish clergy, 1970(%)
Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-64 Over 64 Total Sample
Socialism
24.8
47.2 34.5
3.9
24.9
7.9
0.9
0.7
Communism
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.4
Anarchism
0.6
0.4
0.3
1.3
0.3
0.3
Workers’
15.3 13.7
movements
12.6
12.4 11.0
9.7
3.6
21.7
9.6
51.2
16.3 40.5
Monarchy
2.4
1.0
1.5
3.4
2.7
4.0
Falange Espanola
6.0
7.1
8.5
1.7
7.0
2.9
Republic
Regional
autonomy
Present situation
No response

4.2
4.2
16

5.1
8.3
17.9

4.8
14.0
17.4
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5.6
15.0
12.3

4.7
11.5
12.1

4.9
10.5
15.7

This division was even starker than it appears on Table 4.1 due to the age structuring of
the clergy at the time. As a result of the civil war, clergy ages 30-64 existed in very low
numbers (Perc/-Dia/. 164). Thus, the division between the age groups was polarized
even further by the lack of continuum.
There were sev'eral results of the rebellion of young clergy against the status quo.
First of all, the number of students pursuing seminary studies decreased dramatically
during the 1970s, and, as a result, the youthful clergy ofthe 1960s(Payne 220)had
become middle-aged (Tables 4.2 and 4.3). Table 4.4 shows the dramatic change in age
constitution of the clergy that took place during the 1970s(Cendan 294). This problem
was compounded by the high rate of secularizations among the clergy, a phenomenon
driven by concern over the declining prestige of priesthood, long work hours,
uncompetitive salaries, and the obligation to celibacy(298-301). For example,the 845
secularizations that occurred during the years of 1975-1977 exceeded the number of new
ordinations by 131 (Payne 220). Between the late 1960s and mid-1980s, decreased
ordinations and the high rate of secularization produced a decrease of85 /o in the youth
sector(25-34 years old) of the priest population (Vilarino and Tizon 30). According to
Vilarino and Tizon, this “clear generation gap is the best indicator ofthe extreme level of
priestly decline.”
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Table 4.2: Senior seminary
students in Spain, 1965-82
1965
8000
1970
3500
1975
2000
1979
1505
1980
1583
1981
1686
1982
1728

Table 4.3: Age distribution
of the Spanish clerg>s 1982
Age Percentage of Total
Below 30
3.2
30-34
6.3
11.2
35-39
40-44
14.0
45-49
17.6
50-54
18.9
55-59
10.2
6.1
60-64
6.1
65-69
3.7
70-74
1.6
75-79
8040.7

Table 4.4: Comparison
of ages of Spanish
clergy(in percentages)
1970 1980
Age
12.7 12.1
65-i19.6 35.4
50-64
23.4 31.6
40-49
44.4 20.9
25-39
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The decline in young priests deprived an entire generation of young people ofChurch
leadership with whom they could relate. Furthermore, the younger priests who did not
leave the cloth committed to an entirely new theory of evangelism. Unlike the clergy of
old who “forced” Catholicism upon the masses, these new priests instead offered the faith
freely to the people (Behar 104). This fragmentation of the Spanish Church led to a new
pluralism that contrasted sharply with the unified institution ofthe years of National
Catholicism; the once monolithic Church had converted into a “mosaic ofsects (Codina,
Angel de Prada and Pereda 234). Though the bishops tried to force coherent opinion on
the clergy, their efforts were often unsuccessful. For example, by the early 1990s,only
39 percent of the Spanish clergy supported the Church’s position on birth control without
reservations (Callahan 603). Between the lack ofloyalty ofthe Spanish clergy both to its
profession (as demonstrated by the secularizations) and its clear lack ofcommitment to
traditional Spanish doctrine, the Spanish population was left with little direction as to
what constituted commitment to the faith. If a priest, a person representing highest
vote
obligation to the Church, did not find it necessary to uphold doctrinal beliefs or
according to Church preference, there was little reason for a layperson to do so. This
problem, coupled with the aforementioned cultural and social liberalization experienced
concurrently by the Spanish population, led to the beliefthat one could reject Catholic
doctrine, notably rules concerning sexual practices and church attendance, and still retain
the cultural identity of a “good Catholic.” The new take it or leave it” strategy of young
priests also made Catholicism even more contestable in the new open market for religious
beliefs in which the Church found itself following Vatican II(Perez-Diaz 415).
According to Behar, young people were most affected by this new tactic and most likely
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to say no to religion (104), this religion that each day was evolving more into a faith of
old, detached clergy and young priests who saw religious adherence as optional.
As in the previous chapter, three time periods can be defined with respect to
dissent and fragmentation of the Church, time periods that correspond fairly well to the
age groups defined in Chapter 1. During the 1940s and 1950s, dissent existed, but it was
largely confined to internal Church discourse. As a result, to the public the Church
retained its monolithic character. Coupled with heavy emphasis on outward ritual and
conversion during these decades, this unity created an atmosphere of mandatory practice
that emphasized Franco’s “theology of fear.” This atmosphere, reflected in the high
church attendance rates of the time period, likely influenced the religious development of
the generation that was educated and socialized during this period, namely a large portion
of those bom before 1940(the oldest age group) who were alive in 1990, the year ofthe
WVS. The 1960s and early 1970s were the years ofsocial Catholicism and Vatican-II,
years in which the dissenting voice ofthe clergy was made known with respect to

,albeit

political views and social justice. This period of more public dissent corresponds

approximately, to the years in which the intermediate generation(bom between 1940 and
1960) was educated and socialized. During the years after Franco s death, dissent found
new corridors of expression as the Constitution mandated religious liberties and firee
press. Furthermore, the drain of youth priests caused by the continued high number of
secularizations and low rate of ordinations reached its apex during this time. It was
during these years that the loyalty to the Church became irrelevant as opposed to its state
of confusion during the years of social Catholicism. During the 1960s, few people knew
where the Church stood on political, social and moral issues; during the 1980s, few
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people eared. 'Flic third defined age group(bom between 1960 and 1975) was educated
and socialized during these years of indifference.
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the goal of this argument is not to
establish a linear relationship between the coherence or lack thereofofchurch opinion
and the age divide of religious practice and opinion in Spain, nor is the aim to
oversimplify this relationship. Again, social, economic, and political factors worked
together to create these generation gaps, differences that are unique to Spain within the
European context. However, the research shows that the dissent among the clergy and
the pluralism that resulted affected the beliefs and practices of young people more than
any other age group. This research, together with the previous assumption that religious
habits are solidified during the years in which one is educated and socialized, support the
argument that the fragmentation of the Church contributed to the formation ofthe
generation gaps defined in Chapter 2.
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Chapters: Conclusion

This study defines the generational differences that existed in Spain with respect
to external religious practices and opinions and has demonstrated their validity and
significance through statistical analysis. Furthermore, this study shows the influence that
the declining social and political status ofthe Catholic Church, clerical fragmentation,
and emerging religious pluralism have exerted over the formation ofthese differences.
The desire to avoid oversimplification of these issues cannot be stressed enough, it is
likely that many factors have played a role in establishing these generation gaps, many
of which are in all probability independent ofthe Church. However,one cannot ignore
the powerful role that the studied factors played in shaping these differences, the
historical and statistical evidence supports the argument that the unique intertwining of
government, society, and state seen in Spain provided a sociopolitical backdrop against
which the generation gaps, which are the largest in Western Europe and appreciably
wider than the mean, developed.
It is important to note that the work primarily discusses age-related differences in
religiosity through the 1980s, partly because comprehensive and cohesive sociological
data from the 1990s is not yet available. Further studies can and should be undertaken to
analyze new generational trends; what has happened in more recent years during which
the effects of the Franco dictatorship were waning? In the years after the post-Franco era.
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docs ihc old relationship between I-ranco and the Church still compromise the Church’s
mission.●>
I here is some preliminary evidence that suggests that the generation gaps may
have stopj-ied widening or at the very least that the decline in religiosity of young people
reached a plateau dining the 1990s. The 1990 WVS reported that 9 percent of Spanish
youth ages 16-29 considered themselves “very religious” (Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno
V9). In 1996, this figure w as 10 percent according to a survey conducted by the Centro
dc Investigaciones Sociologicas of youth ages 15-29 (“Expcctativas y preocupaciones
socialesdc los jovenes”). Between 1996 and 1997, the percentage of youth ages 15-19
who considered itself “very” or “quite religious” remained the same within the bounds of
sampling error (“hxpectativas y preocupaciones,” “Los jovenes de hoy”). There is also
evidence that the 1990s witnessed a stabilization in religiosity in general. Figure 5.1
represents the results of a CIS survey over three years that asked participants to predict
trends in religiosity over the following five years (“Expcctativas aho” 1996, 1997, 1998).

Figure 5.1: Response to Question, "In five years, do you
think Spanish society will be...?
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As ihc figure indicates, between 1996 and 1998, there was an increase in the
prediction of sustained religiosity and a complementary decrease in the prediction of
decreased religiosity. At the turn of the century, generational differences still existed, but
it appeared that these differences had not increased greatly over the previous decade.
Table 5.1 shows generational differences reflected in a 2002 survey with respect to selfperceived religiosity (‘‘Religion y sociedad”).

Table 5.1 Response to question:"Do you consider
yourself...?", May-August 2002
18-24 25-3435-4445-5455-6465+
3
3
4
7 11 16
Very religious
21
23 47 37 48 55
Quite religious
45 47 27 37 27 22
Slightly religious
30 25 21
17 10 5
Not religious at all
No answer
1
2
1
2
4 2

Table 5.1 indicates a 13 percent difference between persons over the age of65 and
persons between the ages of 18 and 34 who considered themselves “very religious. In
1990, the difference between persons over the age of50 and persons ages 16-29
concerning the same question was 25 percent. Not only did the generation gap decrease,
but the mean percentage of the “very religious” also decreased by 14 percent during the
same time period. According to the data, a convergence ofreligiosity began to occur in
the 1990s and continued during the 2000s. However,the sustained level ofreligious
practice that appeared in the 1990s did not continue through the 2000s, for reasons that
can be explored in later investigations. It is interesting to note that indirect gains by the
Church, including the rise of the conservative PP to power in 1996 and Spain’s failure to

58

liberalize aboriion law in 1998(Bosch 1130) did not appear to inspire increased or
sustained adherence to religion.
Studies of this type are important in that they analyze Church-society relations,
which arc related to but distinct from Church-state relations. Relations between the
Catholic Church and Spanish society are especially interesting in that the Church still
appears to exert considerable cultural influence over the population through festivals and
Catholic sclf-idcntification, but it exerts little moral influence. What role will the
Spanish Church assume in the following years, especially in light ofthe March 11,2004,
terrorist attacks? Will there be a religious revival among young Spaniards as they reach
for solace and stability in the Church, or has the Church as apolitical and social
instrument has become so detached from mainstream Spanish society, especially from the
youth, that its v'oice is no longer effective? The answers to these questions should prove
interesting as sociological studies in the coming years shed light on the future ofthe
Spanish Church and on the religious trends ofthe Spanish people.
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